Far more general than upon most subjects has been the agreement reached by competent thinkers that Science is essentially a method of investigation. Of course there have been, and there are today, a number of alternative investigatory methods olther than that of Science, just as there are entirely legitimate logics other than that of the syllogism. But Science today is by far the most publicized method in our world, and one concerning which not alone the uninformed man in the street. but a great number of highly competent scientists also hold a singularly touching faith.
This credulity has not sprung up iby reason of any mere perversity. It is a fact that scientific speculations have often unwittingly eventuated in the most practical results, some very beneficial and some equally destructive; and it is an even more impressive fact that scientific speculations have produced the same sort of practical application when they were deliberately prosecuted to that end. There are those who would rely upon this circumstance as the only justification required but they are not among the greatest scientists nor do they constitute anything like a majority.
For Science is a method of investigation. A method for investigating what? The nature of reality, we are told. What, then, is the method that Science applies to this project? Its method comprises four steps:
(1) The accumulation or observation of a large number o'f data appropriate to any given phenomenon.
(2) The construction. of an hypothesis sutbsuming large numbers of the data into a generalization or (if sufficiently broad) a general "law." This stage commences with an intuitive flash, a hunch; the suggestion is then carefully formulated as a formal hypothesis; there follows the rigorous deduction from the hypothesis of such deduced consequences or theorems as verbal syllogistic logic demands must follow, given the correctness of the hypothesis; among these deduced consequences those specific ones are sought upon which there exists no present knowledge regarding their occurrence or non-occurrence.
(3) The setting up of an experimental procedure by which the occurrence or the non-occurrence of the last-mentioned deduced con-sequences of the hypothesis may be demonstrated. At this point syllogistic logic assumes a minor role and we enter the primary field of the logic of Solvitur Ambulando, an equally legitimate logical method, complementary to the first.
(4) The demonstration as to the occurrence or the non-occurrence of the given deduced consequences.
Behind the application of this method which is called Science there lie three assumptions or formal premises, essential in the original meaning of that adjective as pointing to a definfng process.
The firs,t premise cannot be better put than in the words of Einstein:2 "The belief in an external world independent of the perceiving subject is the basis of all natural science." The second premise iss that a correct statement of any phenomenon is such a formulation as bears a one-to-one relationship to the actual (not necessarily the perceived) reality of that phenomenon. The third premise is that the scienitific method holds out the possibility of providing the kind of formulations defined in the second premise. And to this third premise there exists a corollary: that the method is valid when applied to any specific field of inquiry, whether it be botany or electrodynamics or psychology or what-not; this follows from the consideration that Science qua Science is a general method of careful procedure.
Niow with these three premises and the four defined methodological steps let us see what the alleged justifications of Science may be. They are of two fundamental kinds, a valid justification of a negative character and an invalid justification of a positive sort.
Certainly Science dispels ignorance. When the deduced consequences of an hypothesis are demonstrated to be characterized by non-occurrence, it is shown conclusively that the hypothesis is incorrect, i.e., that it does not bear a one-to-one correspondence to the actual reality under investigation. This is the valid negative justification. The positive justification consists in the assertion that when the deduced consequences of any hypothesis are demonstrated to occur, then that hypothesis is shiown to be a correct formulaition of reality; and this justification is as surely false as the previous one was sound.
As to both of these arguments their logic has been exhaustively treated in the logical analysis of the hypothetical syllogism.' In the second case it is shown that the occurrence of the deduced consequence does not demonstrate that its occurrence is due to the validity of the original hypothesis, since ilt may also have occurred in accordance with a quite different (in extreme cases an opposite) hypothesis, from which the same consequence is equally deducible through the operations of syllogistic logic. The Nor can we gain much encouragement from the devices whereby scientists themselves seem accustomed to meet the situation: (a) by disregarding it; (b) 'by begging the question; (c) by the construction of additional safeguards which look plausible at first glance but which, when in 'turn analyzed rigorously, prove their failure to overcome the di'fficulty.
It would serve no proper purpose to discuss (a) or (b); but (c) is a more respectable undertaking. The most careful solution of this character has ibeen descriibed in detail by Northrop. "A frank facing of the presence of the fallacy of affirming the consequent has caused physical scientists to supplement the method of verification of physical theories as indicated above, by an additional scientific procedure. . . Scientists concluded that one can avoid the danger implicit in accepting a theory upon the basis of an argument which commits a formal, logical fallacy, providing we can supplement the mere experimental confirmation of a given theory wilth theoretical considerations going to show that this theory, to some extent at least, is unique in its capacity to give rise deductively to the confirmed consequences... To approximate toward the uniqueness of a deductively-formulated scientific theory it is necessary not merely to have experimental confirmation but also a theoretical investiga-tion of every conceivable theoretical possibility... The point is that a scientific theory carries very much more certainty if one can say not merely that its deductively-formulated theorems have been confirmed, but also that after one has investigated all the conceivable or imaginable possibilities, it is the only one of these possibilities known to date which is confirmed. In fact, this is the only precise way to define a crucial experiment. Such an experiment is not merely one which confirms a given scientific theory; it is, instead, one of a character such that while confirming one theory it repudiates others. . . The point is that the mere experimental confirmation of a scientific theory through its deduced consequences is not generally accepted by competent scientists as a sufficient criterion of the scientific validity of that theory. One must go further and show as far as possible that thetheory in question is the only one which is capable, through its deductive consequences, of taking care of the natural history data. . . In the case of confirmation a theoretical investigation of alternative hypotheses is pursued, with the purpose of showing as far as is possible not merely that a given theory is confirmed by the data, but also that it is the only theory which is so confirmed." 6 The italics in the above quotation are not its author's but ours; by reference to them it is seen immediately what is the matter with this solution. In the first place, you cannot qualify a logical necessity; and it is of no avail to say that such an objection is perfectionist, for after you have said it, you still cannot qualify a logical necessity. All the phrases such as "to some extent," "as far as possible," and the like would have to be omitted in order to m.ake the above technique valid; and it is just those omissions which honesty forbids. In the second place, a crucial experiment is not quite as defined above nor has Science ever performed a really crucial experiment, for the reason that the latter is noot simply one which confirms a given theory while repud;iating others but, instead, one that confirms a given theory while repudiating all others. And in the third place, it is just this truly perfectionist demand in the offered solution which renders it actually impractical and impossible. It is easy enough to write "every conceivable possibility" and "all conceivable or imaginable possibilities" but it is quite another matter actually to be able to take all of these into real a-ccount. The truth, of course, is that no individual scientist, nor In almost all branches of science the mentioned predicament seems plain but it may -be said that in physics at any rate the alternatives to the postulates which are indirectly verified through the theorems are better accounted for. This is because mathematical physicists can put their 'laws' in tensor form such that they must hold for many possible transmissions of coordinates and for various types of geometries, as Lobachevskian, Riemannian, Euclidean, and so on. Even yet., tho-ugh, "many possible itransmissi.ons" are not all possible transmissions nor are various types of geometries all possible types of geometries. To mention merely one circumstance, the usual form of tensor equation used to formulate such physical laws may contain, for example, sufficient giks to deal with a four-dimensional space-time continuum; 'but if the real world "independent of the observer,' which physics is atitempting to investigate, should comprise a six-dimensional rather than a four-dimensional continuum (which there is reason to suspect), it remains to be seen how many of the presently accepted physical 'laws' would survive in their present form when so treated. And that, of course, is only a single case out of other possibilities, all of which it is impossible even to verbalize today.
We have here, then, one of those dilemmas which, because of its apparent 'insolubility, everyone naturally wishes to deny by the unsuccessful means of overlooking it. The writer does not believe that anything real is ever disposed of by such a means and he has an alternative, if somewhat unorthodox, proposal to make. In short,
h-e submits that there exists an actually possible solution for the case.
What is the core of the difficulty that has produced this painful failure of Science to guarantee its findings? It does not reside in the deduced theorelms or consequences of an hypothesis; these can be checked rigorously and they can be logically valid. The real difficulty lies in the uncheckalble premises of the deductions and thus finally in the hunch, or intuitive flash, from wvhich the whole thing starts. We must inquire into the possibility of check and countercheck just here.
It is clear that the originating hunch involved in Step 2 of the scientific method is the result of an inductive process, whether or not of a "conscious" inductive process; and we see that the complete scientific method is a matter of Perduction, i.e., the successive employment oif Induction We must inquire into the grounds which cause any given induction to be either correct or incorrect, into the circumstances which are linked with logical validity in the inductive process. We shall find them, of course, to be different from the grounds that make a deductive process logically valid. Or perhaps they are not really so different, after all. Naturally the logical procedures of the two forms of reasoning are not the same; in a sense they are opposites and in this respect the two problems differ diametrically. But But the question that really concerns us is not quite so artless as that. The hypothesis whose validity as an hypothesis we are trying to check, is at the same time the premise of the deductions to be experimentally tested. In other words we are really investigating the validity of a premise and we cannot stop merely with the single premise which is the hypothesis, for the reason that the inductive process from which the hypothesis is built, itself involves other premises of its own. If we have appreciated the requirement that premises themselves must ibe checked, we cannot stop half-w.ay; the premises of a given induction must rigorously 'be checked also. lf the premises be true the conclusion follows; to eliminate the "if," i.e., to reduce inconclusiveness to certainty, both the induction and its own premises must be validated. It is now that we meet the real crux of the problem and it is now that the logician no longer can aid us.
The premises of the induction from which the hypothesis arises are not of an intrinsically mysterious character. They are simply past experien.ces, previously disconnected, of the inductive reasoner. Suddenly these display an unexpected and hitherto unrecognized relationship and instantaneously the hunch occurs. A great many hunches are demonstrably incorrect. Wlhy? Providing the inductive process itself is correct (and this can be logically checked), it is because the past experiences, the induotive premises, are themselves incorrect perceptions, i.e., such that they do not bear a oneto-one relationship to the actual reality of the "external world independent of the perceiving subject." Our problem now becomes one of distinguishing between correct and incorrect perceptions.
Two previously unrelated facts suddenly become pertinent; indeed they become complementary. (A) Strictly speaking, no external perception is correct by the criterion of Science; the world of external perception is a world of sensory illusion, standing urgently in need of theoretical and rational interpretation. (B) Strictly speaking, no observed man is normal and therefore he cannot be said 'to be a normal perceiver by the criterion of Science; any perceiver,'including ourselves, is delmonstrably abnormal in certain ways and no present guarantee exists that he is not also abnormal in just the pertinent way now required. The normal is here defined as tthat which functions in accordance with ilts inherent design, a definition defended elsewhere. 3 Can we,.then, devise some means to distinguish when and under what circumstances a given perceiver is a normal perceiver and thus when his inductive premises are correct? The first objection to the proposal can be refuted: a perception experieniced by a really normal man must 'be, for the human race, a correct perception. It may not be so for an angel or for an earthworm but for humans ilt must be so because the perceiver is then perceiving in accordance with his inherent design and beyond this no creature, including man, can go, by definitioin.
But the assertion of physical scientists now becomes apposite, viz., th.at any perception is ipso facto illusory and stands in need o'f the mental oonstructs 'of scientific theory in order that it be amended more correctly. It is not quilte dear, perhaps, how a physicist, for instance, becomes an authority on a question which is as plainly and simply a matter calling for psychological, not physical, opinion, as any may be. Although we can all agree with the physi'cist when his assertion refers to an abnormal, i.e., the usual, perceiver, we must do so on common sense grounds rather than professional grounds and the dictum of physical scientists in this matter possesses no scientific standing whatever when we confront the hypothetical case of a normal perceiver.
A preliminary analysis has, in fact, been Nevertheless, the applicability of this new type of perception to the present problem seems plain. The 'selff'-the first term of the three-termed reality, 'self'-onsciousness-object-can never of course know itself; indeed the 'self' can never even dbserve the 'self.' But what the 'self' can do is to observe the organic mechanism, the body, to which it is related and with which a peculiarly intimate relationship is already established by reason of the nature of the real world of which both it and the organic mechanism are parts. Moreover, there is no ascertainable limit to the activity of this kind in which the 'self' can take part. And finally, within the organic mechanism there reside all the data and units of physics but this time the units are the real physical units of the real world, not simply the hypo--thetical and indirectly verifiable units, such as electrons, mesatrons, etc., of science. There is plainly a vital difference between a direct ,nxperience of the phenomena of the real physical units of the real world and 'an hypothesis concerning what the nature of theoretically invented units of this kind may be. A great many safeguards need to be thrown around any such psychological investigation, there are a great many qualifications which must be adhered to without equivocation and some of them are certainly iof a scientific kind, but the point is that such an investigation is not in any sense hypothetical nor does it include theory of any kind to call for the indirect verification which is the method of science. For that very reason there is nowhere in the procedure that the fallacy of affirming the consequent can arise. And it is the latter fallacy that concerns us primarily here.
On the broader point-finally to decide this question of the human norm is a task of psychology which is not at all met by statistical or other investigations into the characteristics of men as they now (abnormally) are found. It is objected then that psychology is noit prosecuting this task. But it may equally be answered in turn that no insurmountable obstacle prevents psychology from employing the scientific method for that very purpose. The objection is far from a rebuttal, it is a reproach.
The question as to the real character of the human norm, as distinguished entirely from the quite different question as to the actual human average or median, is a difficult, lengthy, and subtle one, depending primarily upon the detailed discovery of the basic human paradic. But it is nowhere shown that this question is incapable of solution; it is only stated-and alas, truthfully-that no general efforts are being made in that direction. Yet it is difficult to think of a more important problem or one more legitimately psydhological. Here we have discussed simply one aspect of its importance: until it is solved, Science itself remains without any final validation and all its positive findings suspect of falsity but without any alternative suggestion as to how they may rationally be guaranteed.
